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1. 
Arriving with the last Wave of the great migrations in the 961 century, the Hungarians 
as "latecomers" met with a medieval social structure firmly established in Europe. That 
situation and the existing geopolitical configuration left them no option other than 
adaptation to the prevailing pattern of conditions. Creation of appropriate sets of 
cultural, social and legal conditions formed part of that process.' Clearly, then, the 
Hungarians soon came to feel the need for "harmonization". Along with the coronation 
regalia and Christianity, our King St. Stephen adopted several other values of the West, 
with artists and intellectuals arriving in Hungary and with significant spiritual assistance 
received, particularly from the Church. All these combined to exert a notable effect on 
the laws of St. Stephen and other measures of his which came down in writing. Roman 
law and Roman culture, canon law and Christianity had a decisive influence on the 
Hungarian course of development, one that continued to be felt in the centuries that 
followed. Romanization not only permeated contemporary Hungarian legislation, but 
also had a considerable bearing on law enforcement by the courts and the Chancery. The 
teaching of law and jurisprudence equally played an important role in transmitting the 
effects of Ronianization. Although short-lived in consequence of turbulent historical 
events, the law schools of medieval Hungary had the services of many professors from 
famous foreign universities. In like manner, many of the Hungarian professors obtained 
their diplomas at European universities of great fame. Numerous practising lawyers and 
other intellectuals educated in law similarly availed themselves of that opportunity.' 
National aspirations have always been accompanied by certain factors of harmonization 
in Hungarian legal development. In our legal history the agents of harmonization were 
and are an economic and social structure similar to that of Western Europe and the 
efforts to measure up to the European standards.' Hungarian private and commercial law 
definitely followed the European course of development from the mid-19th century 
down to World War Two. Law-making relied on wellfounded studies of comparative 
law. Codifiers drew heavily on foreign legal institutions, mainly of Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland and France. In point of fact, Hungarian economic thinking followed the 
same pattern. The need soon became obvious for the Hungarian economy and economic 
'See Mádi, F.: Ius Commune Europae, Jogtudományi Közlöny, No. 3 of 1990, pp. 117-118. 
2 See Mádi, F.: Ius Commune Europae, p. 118. 
3 See Mádi, F.: Ius Commune Europae, p. 118. 
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actors to be open to other countries. It was a necessity for the Hungarians to recognise - 
the wisdom lying in "multilateral interest compensation", and they acted accordingly: 
For what else, if not "multilateral interest" compensation , was the fact, for instance, that 
in 1335, at the „Visegrád Conference" in the Castle of Visegrád, our King Robert 
Charles saw to it that Kings John of Bohemia and Casimir of Poland, who were his 
guests, received the following gifts: "Charles presented John with 50 silver jugs and a 
wonderful chess-board and Casimir with 500 marks (about 125 kg.) of the "finest" gold 
to enable him to pay his debt to the „Czech ruler.° Later, of course, history imposed 
strong restrictions on the possibilities of our economic development, and our external 
economic relations were also largely one-sided, but, due perhaps to these circumstances 
as well, there was hardly any need for the meaning of a wider dimension, of integration, 
to be explained to this country. Nevertheless, the hope of a truly forward-oriented 
integration was late in looming on the horizon of the Hungarian economy, because the 
small states with different configurations in Central and Eastern Europe or the regions 
comprising them never united in voluntary integration, although more than once they 
formed part of some larger compact whole, which the outside world also regarded as a 
unit. However, the force of integration was outside the region itself every time. The 
Habsburg empire undoubtedly represented a formation of high-level integration, forming 
a single customs union at the empire level, which also meant a common foreign trade 
policy as we understand it today, with foreign and military affairs similarly conducted in 
common. While the German Third Reich's zone of interest in Central-Eastern Europe 
was made up of states that appeared more or less independent, the centre's 
overwhelming military superiority secured political harmony and a type of economic 
cooperation responsive to German needs. In like manner, Central and Eastern Europe 
occupied by the Soviet Union consisted of separate states for the most part, yet their 
military and foreign political unity was guaranteed by the strongly centralised Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation and their economic cooperation was secured by CMEA, which 
turned central planning into a tool of integration.' 
As regards Hungary, the shift in its relationship to EC, which had been hopelessly 
rejectionist and hostile, started in parallel with the preparations for reforming the 
Hungarian system of economic management in the second part of the 1960s and was 
marked by a series of relatively small and cautious steps for some 20 years. Obviously, 
restraints on the Hungarian economic reforms were placed directly by the sanctity of the 
primacy of state ownership and indirectly by the monolithic political structure, which 
had for a long time prevented any economic pluralism from taking root. Finally, 
enforced adjustment to the great-power interests of Soviet foreign policy was another 
factor creating an unfavourable external environment for the Hungarian reforms. 6 
It was the speedy process of political and economic transformations that made it 
possible for EC, at the Summit Meeting of Dublin on 28 April 1990; to raise the idea of 
signing association agreements with Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republic and 
Poland. Hungary warmly welcomed that Community initiative. From the outset the 
4 See Mádi, F.: Az európai integráció sodrában: a  Visegrádi Négyek közép-európai szabadkereskedelmi 
övezete (In the Drift of European Integration: the Central-European Free Trade Zone of the Four of Visegrád), 
Európajogi tanulmányok I. (Ed. F. Mádi), Budapest, 1993, p. 154. 
3 See Balázs, P.: Magyarország európai integrációs felzárkózásinak  története és perspektívái, különös 
tekintettel a nyugati-európai integráció fejlődésére (the History and Perspectives of Hungary's Case for 
Integration into Europe, with Particular Emphasis on the Development of West European Integration), Kézirat 
(Manuscript), Budapest, 1993, p. VI. 
6  See Balázs, P.: op. cit., p.1. 
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Antall Government's program had accorded priority to the plan for "return" to Europe, 
and the desire to join the European Community had been formulated as a strategic goal. 
In July 1990, giving expression to that endeavour, Prime Minister József Antall of 
Hungary handed Jacques Delors, President of the Commission of the European 
Community, a Memorandum which summed up Hungary's proposals concerning the 
substance of association. Following upon the exploratory talks, the negotiations to 
conclude an Association Agreement commenced in Brussels on 21 December 1990 and, 
as a result of eight official and one technical rounds and several expert meetings, ended 
on 22 November 1991, when the draft text was initialled. The Association Agreement 
and the Provisional Agreement containing the former's provisions on trade and trade 
related matters were signed by the Prime Minister and the Minister of International 
Economic Relations, respectively. The negotiations with Poland and the Czech and 
Slovak Republic were conducted parallel to those with Hungary, and the Agreements 
were signed at the same time. Our Provisional Agreement went into effect on 1 March 
1992 and our Association Agreement — following ratification by the European 
Parliament, the Hungarian Parliament and the Parliaments of the 12 Member States — 
entered into force on 1 February 1994. 
The Contracting Parties of the Association Agreement are Hungary on the one hand 
and, on the other, the three Communities (the European Economic Community, the 
European Atomic Energy Community and the European Coal and Steel Community) and 
their Member States. Thus the Association Agreement is a "mixed treaty" of which the 
Communities as well as the member states are contracting parties. The Preamble to the 
Agreement uses the term "Community" denoting all the three Communities, so it is a 
matter of interpretation to decide which Community is, or perhaps all Communities are, 
to be regarded as the subject of a particular right or obligation in a given case. Although, 
as is known, the three Communities have the same system of institutions, the 
competence and functioning of the different Communities are governed by different 
rules, so making a distinction between the Communities is of continuing relevance. 
Guidance in this respect is provided by the law of the Community rather than by the 
Association Agreement. The main reason for the conclusion of a mixed agreement was 
the fact that the matters regulated affect and require the competence of both the 
Community and the member states. It should be added that the delimitation of powers 
between the Community and the member states is not crystal-clear at present and that, 
moreover, the dividing lines are in a state of flux. This problem is resolved by the term 
"Parties", for, in a particular context; it should .be understood to mean the member states 
or the Community or both.' On the part of Hungary, the contracting party is the 
Hungarian State, not the Government. Although the matters regulated relate to questions 
within the Government's competence and implementation of the Agreement in this field 
could be ensured by government regulations, numerous provisions refer to matters 
subject to statutory coverage.' 
7 See Kecskés, L.: EK-jog és jogharmonizáció (EC Law and Law Harmonization); Budapest, 1995, p. 
301. 
8 See Kecskés, L.: op. cit., p. 301. 
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Since 1990 Hungarian civil-law and economic legislation has adopted numerous 
solutions from the legal systems of other countries. There is no doubt that the first place 
is occupied by EC law as regards the frequency of such adoptions, but our law has also 
incorporated several legal solutions of national legal systems. 
Hungarian civil-law, codification has so far followed two main directions during the 
period since the change in the political regime in 1990. One direction is represented by 
the partial reregulation of property relations and, in that context, by the legislation on 
compensation. Our related legislation showed a conservative tendency manifested in 
"annulling" certain earlier unlawful or quasi unlawful acts of the State. In this domain 
we generally could not but cast side-glances at solutions or attempts at solutions by 
those countries of Central-Eastern Europe which were in a similar situation. 
The other direction concerned the goal of laying the groundwork for a social market 
economy. It stood to reason that relevant regulations followed a liberal trend. In this 
field we could draw more heavily on the law-making experience of Western Europe and 
even overseas countries, with adjustment to EC law becoming an increasingly 
determinate factor. 
The EC's law harmonization program formulates requirements to which the national 
legal systems of the member states have to be adjusted on a continuing basis. Hungary's 
law harmonization obligation will not lapse with its becoming a member of EC. Even 
after the hoped-for status of member state has been gained, we shall have to keep - 
"adjusting" our standards to the legal material of EC, which will continue to change in 
the meantime. It should also be borne in mind that EC law is not a static one, but it is 
developing dynamically. Also, EC rules on law harmonization tend. to change. In 
drawing up Hungary's law harmonization program it seems practicable to take into 
account the perspective development of EC law as well. Therefore it appears advisable 
for us to work with some margin of "forward orientation". 
Hungary's Association Agreement with the European Communities and their member 
states, the so-called European Agreement, makes evident the need for the Hungarian 
system of law or for a large part of its rules to be brought into line with Community law. 
Articles 67 and 68 of the Association Agreement contain the main provisions on law 
harmonization. As it appears from Art. 67, those pro' ions form -part of the "soft" 
material of the Association Agreement inasmuch as Hungarian legislation must, for the 
time being, be harmonized "so far as possible": The Contracting Parties recognise that a 
fundamental sine qua non for Hungary's integration into the community consists in the 
approximation of its present and future laws and regulations to Community law. 
Hungary must ensure that its future legislation will be consistent so far as possible with 
community law. Art. 68 regulates Hungary's law harmonization. obligations in these 
terms: The approximation of law must extend in particular to the following fields: 
customs law, company law, bank law, enterprise accounting and taxation, law of 
intellectual property, workers' protection at the workplace, financial services, rules of 
competition, protection of the life and health of persons, animals and plants, food • 
regulations, consumer protection, including liability for product, indirect taxation, 
technical rules and standards, transportation, and environmental protection. 
The fields of law enumerated in the Association Agreement coincide with the main 
subject areas of EC's law harmonization program. They embrace the economic-
commercial domains of law, but EC has for the time being little to do with the classical 
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parts of civil law. The community seeks to influence that legal material in a more 
indirect way, through multilateral international agreements and by encouraging member 
states to accede to them. It is only recently that the legal life of the community has 
shown keener interest in the classical institutions of civil law. The late 1980s saw the 
beginning of a spectacular experiment. On the mandate of EC a working group of 
scientists, (Land Committee) was set up in 1989 to try, in the field of contract law, to 
elaborate a uniform legal material which might serve as a basis for Community law 
harmonization even in respect to the classical institutions of civil law. A similar activity 
is pursued by another scientific *committee, the Storm Committee, with a view to 
unification of the law of civil procedure. 
At any rate, the catalogue of items in EC's .law harmonization program shows, as is 
also reflected in the enumeration of the subject-matters of law harmonization in the 
Association Agreement with Hungary, that while the system of Community commercial 
law has been largely developed at the level of Community law, a national commercial 
law as a separate branch of law in the national legal systems of member states cannot 
emerge precisely for this reason. In point of fact, Brussels' great law harmonization 
magnet is attracting elements of a civil-law nature and consequently the legal systems of 
member states retain no elements unintegrated by the community which could constitute 
body of commercial law, i.e. a separate branch of law, within national frameworks. This 
important determinant feature should also be taken into account in the development 
trends of the Hungarian legal system. Accordingly it is not worth while to deal with the 
idea of developing Hungary's commercial law. We have to come to terms with the fact 
that the structure of Hungarian law will also decisively be influenced by Community law 
in the long run. 
In adopting our position rejecting the separation of commercial from civil law, 
namely the .recognition of commercial law as a separate branch of law, we relied on the 
experience of comparative law as well. On this basis and within a historical context, it 
may be stated that the emergence of commercial law was attributable not only to the 
immanent slowness of civil-law codification, but always to some concrete situation of 
political history in which the bourgeoisie was unable to affirm its interests within the 
frameworks of civil-law codification. This is why the legal history of individual states 
mainly developed in such a way that commercial law or the commercial code appeared 
where and when the codification of civil law was blocked for one reason or another. 
It is a fact that European legal literature witnessed a significant wave of upturn in 
commercial law a few decades ago, in response partly to a genuine internationalization 
of commercial law after ,World War Two, to the world trade euphoria at the time, partly 
to the popularity and vogue in Europe of the USA Uniform Commercial Code. That 
wave, however, drifted down the large European river of legal literature at least 15 years 
ago. Recently the idea of civil law unification has grown prevalent again, and plans for 
civil-law codification are undoubtedly reviving today. This has repeatedly brought 
forward the case of a Uniform European Civil Code as an issue of the day. In 1989, for 
instance, the question of organising the work of codification was taken up even by the 
European Parliament. For the moment, I myself do not believe in the reality of 
elaborating a Uniform European Civil Code, but there is a possibility of unification in 
partial aspects of certain subject-matters. This is best illustrated by the United Nations 
Vienna Convention of 1980 on International Sale of Goods, which the European 
communities have also encouraged their member states to ratify. 
290— LÁsab KEcsictS 
A factor of importance to law harmonization, too, concerns the degree to which the 
adoptive legal system is open to reception of solutions and institutions: of foreign legal 
systems in general. Hungary's legal development has been adoptive in this respect. Our 
legal life has been marked by no rooted aversion to foreign laws. Our legal history has 
recorded incidents of aversion to only 3 foreign laws. The first such occasion was the 
1861 National Conference of High Justices, where our forefathers decided against 
keeping Austrian law in effect in Hungary. That was understandable; for the Austrian 
private law had been kept in force in Hungary under political pressure between 1853 and 
1861. In the 20th century it was during the intervening period to World War Two that a 
certain Hungarian national aversion was felt to German law. At that time, by proclaiming 
the theory of "self-luminous laws", our professors denied the effect, otherwise 
unquestionable, of German legal thinking on Hungarian legal development and tried to 
emphasise the similarity of Hungarian law to Anglo-Saxon law. The advocates of that 
doctrine went so far as to deny the fact of reception of Roman law into Hungary, solely 
because the route of adoption had led through Germany. The most spectacular work of 
that trend in legal literature was Béni Grosschmid's book entitled "Werbőczy and 
English Law" published in 1928. 9 Finally, it is the socialist era that in our legal history 
can be seen as an element of aversion to foreign law. That element cannot be traced at 
all in the socialist legal literature of Hungary. Otherwise the Soviet law exerted but a 
relatively small influence on Hungary's socialist civil law, with its effects felt on not 
more than 6 or 7 legal institutions. 
Basically, Hungarian law has never refused to adopt elements of foreign law. Just the 
contrary. Adoption of foreign legal institutions has been of great importance during 
periods of modernization in the development of our legal system. The noted bill of 1928 
on Hungarian private law, an essential document of the one-time modernization of our 
private law, incorporated, inter aha, German, Austrian, French and Swiss elements, 
which were largely retained in the Civil Code (Act N of 1959). That was a great 
achievement, since the work of codifying the Civil Code was nearing completion in the 
middle and the second part of the 1950s, an immensely difficult political period. 
IIL 
In 1990 the codification of civil and economic law started under difficult 
professional circumstances, as in the 1980s our legal system had shown up contradictory 
trends of development despite the indisputably positive tendencies. For instance, there 
was general confusion about defining the concept of state ownership. There was no clear 
answer even to the simple question of who was the subject of state ownership: the State 
or the state enterprises. What we had for a guide was no more than recipes at the level of 
a cookery book in applying confused alternative concepts of state ownership. From the 
time of introduction in 1984-85 of a new enterprise typology, particularly of the state 
enterprise of a self-governing type, there emerged a completely distorted trend in our 
law of economic organisation as well. The contemporary "promters" were obviouOy 
influenced by Yugoslavian "hallucinations" in making suggestions for the introduction of 
self-governing state enterprises. The only problem was that state ownership never 
existed in Yugoslavia, not even at the time when the State existed, but what was put into 
" See Grosschmid, B.: Werbőczy és az angol jog (Werbőczy and English Law), Budapest, 1928. 
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practice in the "associated labour" organizations substituting state enterprises was 
virtually direct social ownership of property. That, however, had no tradition in 
Hungary. An extremely confused situation resulted from the fact that, with the reform of 
enterprise typology in 1984-85, the Hungarian theory and the work of codification had 
moved in the direction of recognising the ownership of state enterprises in fixed assets. 
A solution for that hopelessly contradictory state of affairs was sought in summer of 
1990 by amendments to the relevant laws and regulations which made it clear that state 
property was owned by the State, i.e. the Treasury, not by the state enterprises. The legal 
entity theory was likewise on the decline by the end of the socialist era. The theory of 
legal entity in civil and public law was similarly characterised by a tendency to 
oversimplification. This is how matters stood: in civil law, legal personality coalesced in 
the condition of subject at law, which in turn was limited to legal capacity until finally 
the criterion of legal personality was now and then manifested only in the capacity to sue 
and to be sued, whereas in public law, oversimplification lay in the reduction of legal 
personality to the condition of subject at law and in the latter's limitation to powers. In 
public law, virtually any organisation and organ vested with powers was regarded as a 
legal entity. 
Since the introduction of the "new economic mechanism" in 1968, the development 
of Hungary's socialist law relating to the economy had experienced a longdrawn-out 
period of modernization at a not too rapid rate, which certainly gained momentum in the 
second part of the 1980s. However, at that "reform-socialist" stage of development in 
our legal system, Hungarian legislation had not yet been marked by any orientation to 
the European Community. This is understandable, for those directing the reforms had a 
rather uncertain vision of the future at the time. What is more, the terms "European 
Community" and "Common Market" occasionally had pejorative overtones in Hungary. 
Therefore the reformers disregarded the development trends in EC law and confined 
themselves to borrowing from the legal systems of certain western countries solutions 
that they deemed fit to follow. The tax reform followed Scandinavian examples, our law 
of association is patterned on the German model, and our Securities Act reflects basic 
elements of Anglo-Saxon law. Thus the laws and regulations reflecting economic 
modernization at the end of the 1980s show a rather eclectic picture. It is therefore 
absolutely necessary to reappraise the legal developments in those years of reform, now 
in the context of EC law criteria. 
IV 
Our adhesion to EC's law harmonization program is an important factor in the 
modernization of Hungary's legal system as well. It would be hardly disputable that our 
legal system is also modernised through compliance with EC's law harmonization 
requirements. The modernising effect of law harmonization cannot naturally be reduced 
to our legal system becoming "better" and "simpler". The illusion about the goal of 
making a "better law" and a "simpler law", which was entertained at the very outset, has 
been abandoned even by Community law. In a legal sense, too, we should conceive of 
modernization rather as a process conducive to bridging over differences between centre 
and periphery. According to Kálmán Kulcsár, "the substance of the modernization 
process is in removing the contradiction between the challenges ensuing from 
phenomena of the historically organic development of centre societies and the pressure 
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for answers to challenges breaking and diverting the organic development (stagnation in 
a given case) of periphery societies and stemming from the centre. However, the 
situations thus emerging tend to vary, may differ from one another in response to various 
factors".'° "We would narrowly and hence wrongly interpret the process of 
modernization if we merely considered it as one of 'catching up', in which differences 
between centre and periphery were reduced by adopting the institutions of the centre. 
Elimination of differences in development in the centre-periphery relationship — and 
concurrently modernization in substance — means adoption rather than 'simple catching 
up'. Nevertheless, the process of integration into the world economy and, let me add, 
into the global community — which may in perspective eliminate 'subordination', usually 
a concomitant attribute and state up to now — cannot evolve except in the second, 
'residual' phase after the upswing of modernization. And this may result in pursuing a 
path of development based on the internal conditions of a given society, including its 
historical peculiarities, and growing into an organic process (generating new pushings 
and removing attendant cyclical pressures for reform). This is the real substance of the 
modernization process. " 
Similarly, both unification and harmonization of law mean reception of law, namely a 
process in which a legal system incorporates the rules of another. The relationship 
between reception, unification and modernization of law was also discussed by Gyula 
Eörsi in his famous book on "Comparative Civil Law" published in 1975. He proceeded 
from the fact that the concept of reception was disputed and hard to define, because the 
dividing line grew blurred between conscious and spontaneous reception • and, more 
recently, between reception and unification of law or between adoption of certain 
provisions and reception. 12 In his view, the deepest seated cause of reception is the 
exhausted adoptive energy of the existing law in addition to political, economic and 
lego-professional factors. Reception is generally directed towards modernization of law 
once the adoptive energies of law have exhausted or if they are unable to come into 
play." "The minimum requirement of reception is for one law to permeat another in a 
larger field of law. As regards unification of law, if law is unified not only on the 
international plane, but unification comes to govern domestic legal relations of the State 
promulgating the unified law, we are inclined to consider it as a modern form of 
reception, because in this case the state receives another law by a legislative act, even 
though that law is not one of any other particular state.'" 4 
Thus, the thesis that law harmonization is equal to both reception and unification of 
law is reliably consistent with the views of Kálmán Kulcsár and Gyula Eörsi on 
modernization, adaptation, reception and unification of law. It is nevertheless worth 
keeping in mind what Ernő Várnay wrote in connection with our topic, since thereby we 
may reduce eventual undue expectations about Hungarian-EC law harmonization: "The 
periphery always exhibits a strong tendency to hasten. development by legal means, to 
seek apparent „solutions" for problems by laws and regulations"." 
I° See Kulcsár, K.: A modernizáció és a jog (Modernization and Law), Budapest, 1989,  P.  14. 
11 See Kulcsár, K.: op. cit., p. 15. 
12 See Eörsi, Gy.: Összehasonlító polgári jog (Comparative Civil Law), Budapest, 1975, p. 532. 
13 See Eörsi, Gy.: op. cit. pp. 533 and 538. 
14 See Eörsi, Gy.: op. cit. p. 532. 
15 See Várnay, E.: Az EK—magyar társulási megállapodás és közösségi jog (The EC-Hungarian 
Association Agreement and Community Law), Európa Fórum, No. II. of 1992, p. 68. 
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The adjustment of Hungarian legislation to EC's law harmonization program is an 
important element also of the process going on in the Hungarian legal system toward a 
change in the type of law. It was the change in the political regime in 1990 that opened 
the way to transforming the Hungarian system of law, formerly established 
antidemocratically and conditioned by a one-party socialist type of law, into a type of 
law of a truly civil conditionality. Hungarian law harmonization with EC will have a 
fundamental role to play in completing the process of change in the type of law, which 
got under way in 1990. 1 ' 
As our Association Agreement contains no separate rules on the mechanism, 
methodology and techniques of law harmonization, we have no choice but to take into 
account the rules of Community law governing law harmonization, at least as a basis of 
departure or analogy. To put it very simply we have no other point of reference. 
Therefore in our efforts at law harmonization, we must be oriented by the rules of the 
EEC Treaty on law harmonization (e.g. para. (h) of Art. 3, Art.100, paras. (1) to (5) of 
Art.100/a) and the decisions of the European Court concerning law harmonization. 
In EC law governing law harmonization it is the larger "freedom" which the States 
obligated for law harmonization enjoy in certain fields of law, within the compass of 
"fundamental protection requirements", notably in questions of security, consumer 
protection and environmental protection, that may be of importance to devising the 
Hungarian strategy for law harmonization. As a matter of fact, the States concerned are 
not required to adopt Community law in these domains if their respective national laws 
afford a greater measure of protection for citizens than Community law does. However, 
our attention is also deserved by the rule allowing member states to introduce security 
measures, where necessary, even against EEC provisions on law harmonization, but only 
when warranted by causes described in Art. 36 of the EEC Treaty (public morals, public 
interest or public safety; protection of the health and life of persons, animals and plants; 
protection of national property embodying artistic, historical or archaeological 
property). The measures introduced may only be transitory, temporary. [See Art.100/a, 
paras. (3) and (5), of the EEC Treaty.] 
Hungary's law harmonization obligation in connection with the very implementation 
of the Association Agreement is evidently of a much wider scope than that determined 
by Art. 68, because EC law harmonization requirements must be extended to our legal 
system as a whole. We must undertake efforts to ensure that our legal system will be 
more transparent and that our future legislation will not bring it into conflict with EC 
law. Eventual conflicts must be resolved. In developing our legal system we should keep 
in mind the directions determined by EC law, its fundamental liberal philosophy, and its 
requirements concerning the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. 
The extent to which a legal system adopts the rules of Community law appears to be 
relatively measurable: The amount and ratio of change in law are comparatively easy to 
examine by jurimetric methods. It should be taken into account; however, that EC does 
not place concrete demands upon member states obligated for law harmonization, but it 
employs a more general method [Art. 3 (h) of the EEC Treaty] in providing that the law 
harmonization obligation of member states must secure the "proper functioning of the 
Common Market". As can be seen, EC does not appraise the quality of member states' 
16 For the concepts of type of law and legal system, see Elirsi: Összehasonlító polgári jog (Comparative 
Civil Law), pp. 47-51 and 61-99. 
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legal systems primarily by formal criteria, including jurimetric, but rather it proceeds 
from the specific function which its law harmönization program is destined to fulfil. 
When reflecting about, the measurability of perspective changes in the Hungarian 
legal system, of Hungary's compliance with its law harmonization obligations, we 
should also .bear in mind that in certain cases harmonization can be accomplished by 
methods of deregulation as well. So; in future "measurements", attention should be paid 
not only to the actually new positive substance of legislation, but also to its deregulatory 
aspects. 
At major role in coordinating and directing the activities concerning compliance with 
our law harmonization obligations is reserved for the Ministry of Justice: Decision. No. 
2006/1990. (HT. 4.) of the Council of Ministers on "Procedure for Harmonization with 
the Law of the :European Community" charged the Minister of Justice with primary 
responsibility for ensuring that the law-making organs take into account the relevant 
rules of Community law in judging the necessity of new laws and regulations and 
adopting them. The Ministry of Justice started work on law harmonization partly by 
acting within its own sphere of competence, vested in it by. the Act on Legislation, under 
the ordinary procedure for preparation of laws and regulations, partly in the Legal 
Subcommittee of the Interdepartmental Committee set up to coordinate government 
tasks connected with European integration. Essentially in conformity with the substance 
of the aforementioned Government Decision, the hungarian rules on the techniques and 
procedures meeting the law harmonization requirements have also been formulated at 
the statutory level. The question of law harmonization is similarly addressed by Act I of 
1994 promulgating the European Agreement on the Establishment of Association 
between the Republic of Hungary and the European Communities and Their Member 
States, signed at Brussels on 16 December 1991. The Act provides that in preparing and 
concluding international treaties of the Republic of Hungary as well as in proposing and 
adopting its laws and regulations the harmony thereof with the European Agreement 
must be ensured. The requirements as determined by Art. 67 of the European Agreement 
must be fulfilled in the preparation and adoption of laws and regulations: This Act added 
the following paragraph to Art. 40 of Act XI of 1987 on Legislation: "If a bill affect's the 
subject-matter of the European Agreement Establishing Association between the 
Republic of Hungary. and the, European Communities and Their Member States, signed 
at Brussels on 16. December 1991, the motivation thereto shall also provide information 
about the extent to which the proposed regulation meets the requirement of 
approximation to the laws and, regulations of the European Communities and about 
whether the regulation is consistent with the laws and regulations of the European 
Communities". Section 11 of Government Decree No. 41/1990. (M:15) on the 
responsibilities and Competence of the Minister of Justice was likewise supplemented 
with the following provision: "The Minister of Justice shall comment on draft laws from 
the additional viewpoint of whether it conforms to the requirement of consistence with 
the law of the European Community. He shall present his view to the Government 
meeting and, where necessary in the case of a bill, to: the parliamentary committee 
concerned with the subject-matter of the bill." 
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These new rules are indicative of the steps taken by Hungary toward recognising the 
primacy of Community law. The relevant new regulations have given effect to the 
primacy of community law with respect to the current and future processes of Hungarian 
legislation, but naturally that primacy does not yet prevail over the full material .of the 
Hungarian legal system. In a few important areas the Association Agreement has 
established a certain link between the' Hungarian legal system and the EC system of law. 
It is on this basis that Hungary must comply with its obligations to harmonize its law 
with the European Community. It should be seen; however, that our link to the 
Community is theoretically rather contradictory by reason of -the transitory character of 
the associate status. Notably the Association Agreement linked the Hungarian legal 
system only with the "secondary law" of the Community, i.e.: with the enormous fabric 
of community regulations, directives, recommendations and opinions. Thus the 
Hungarian legal system has come into contact with the vast body of positive community 
law, which determines the law harmonization obligations of member states; too, in 
substantive terms. On the other hand, the Association Agreement established no such 
link with the "primary, law" of the Community i.e. with the Treaties that once 
established the Communities and with the agreements that have modified the since. This, 
too, is an enormous legal material, with the Maastricht Treaty on European Union being 
the 14th in the array of its components. In effect, the Hungarian legal system will not be 
linked with E .C's "primary law", the virtual "public law" of the community, before 
Hungary becomes a member state of EC. This statement does not hold for Art. -62- of 
the Association Agreement on the regulation of "competition and, other economic 
provisions". Para. (2) of Art. 62 refers directly to a passage in the text of the EEC Treaty 
and spells out that any practice contrary to regulations on competition and other 
economic provisions, namely to Art. 62, must be judged according to the criteria arising 
from application of the rules laid down in Arts. 85; 86 and 92 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community. 
The fact that by virtue of the Association Agreement the Hungarian legal system is 
not also linked with the practice of the European Court, the EC court based in . 
Luxembourg, appears to be more problematic from the angle of the practice of law 
harmonization. True, this leaves Hungary in a much more favourable situation than it 
would enjoy if it were required to apply the dogmas contained in some of the European 
Court's judgements in the nature of precedent and to use them as a "yardstick" for 
judging its compliance with its law harmonization obligations. In this situation, however, 
we should, be aware that, and we emphasise that this is not of disadvantage to Hungary, 
our law harmonization obligations appear to be somewhat diffuse, without a contour, for 
the EC rules on law harmonization come to operate effectively precisely through the 
dogmas set forth in the caselaw of the European Court. 
VI. 
The commencement of Hungarian law harmonization raises a question concerning 
the timing and phasing of this work. as well as the form which the legislative source of 
law harmonization should take. Moreover, we have to face up to perceptual problems. In 
Hungarian public opinion there prevail two extremist views regarding law 
harmonization. Perhaps they are rather politically motivated and make their effects felt 
in the professional world. Some claim there is no need for harmonization of our law with 
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EC law, while others urge speedy action, preferring harmonization virtually overnight, 
which they reduce to tasks of mere translation and mechanical putting into force. 
Obviously, law harmonization is time-consuming and calls for a good deal of 
professional foresight. It defies mechanical methods. However pressing our concrete law 
harmonization obligations may occasionally become, we shall have to fulfil them in the 
awareness that even the law of the State obligated for law harmonization has inner 
values, institutions, dogmatic aspects and important elements of substance which 
deserve protection. It does not appear impossible to have this consideration prevail, for, 
as is also shown by the experience of European integration, the depth of harmonization 
with community law does not really affect the dogmatic structures. The emphasis is 
rather on pragmatic elements, and these are also covered by rules of the EEC Treaty 
which afford some protection for solutions of national legal systems vis-a-vis 
Community law. 
We can make-good use of the earlier and current experience which countries with 
:more developed economic and legal systems have gained in law harmonization. On the 
other hand, it would be a great mistake to mechanically copy another country's law 
harmonization program already implemented wholly or in part, for such method, would 
not allow but an inorganic reception of community law. Indeed, historical experience 
shows that nothing but organic reception can produce useful results, a working law for 
the adoptive country. 
The West European countries which might serve as, an example had a level of 
economic development and a quality of legal system different from those which Hungary 
has now when they were first confronted with the law harmonization requirements of 
EEC. Nor should we forget that the rules of EC law regulating law harmonization have 
also undergone many changes since the advanced countries of Western Europe, 
embarked on the approximation of their legal systems within the framework of EEC: 
Consequently we have no choice but to go our own way in law harmonization. The rules 
adopted from Community law must be combined with the operative legal material of the 
Hungarian system of law. The fibres of two systems stemming from different roots must 
be linked in such a way as to ensure the working of our law modernised by this method 
as well. Harmonization of law, too, amounts to reception, and as is generally the case 
with reception of law, law harmonization is only successful in organic form, only if 
account is taken of the determinant elements of active adaptation in legal development. 
Inorganic reception disregarding active adaptation or legal regulations adopted through 
inorganic law harmonization do not result in a working law.'' 
The entry into force of our Association Agreement on 1 February 1994 gave a strong 
impulse to law harmonization in Hungary, because this country is required by the 
Association Agreement in a legal sense, too; to harmonize its law. Thus the question of 
harmonization or no harmonization cannot be disputed. We can devote all our energies 
to making law harmonization meaningful. We cannot content ourselves with formal 
harmonization, with the phenomenon, still encountered now and then, that while the 
preparers of draft laws make in the preamble superficial references to the need to take 
EC law into account and perhaps even invoke some Community directives with 
indication of their numbers, the relevant substantive elements of EC law do not appear 
in the draft texts. It is an important requirement that in preparing acts of national 
17 See Eörsi: összehasonlító polgári jog (Comparative Civil Law), pp. 391-412. and 532-539. 
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legislation we should take stock. and make the acquintance of the entire body of EC law 
relating to the subject-matter of regulation. 
Law harmonization must be thorough and profound, from article to article. A 
procedure under which a handbook on EC law is on the table of a "consultative" meeting 
preparatory to legislation, but it is closed; while topical domestic issues are being 
discussed, is no harmonization of law. The handbook must be opened, and we must be 
familiar with EC law! Lawyers of EC member states have developed an interesting dual 
awareness of Community law. They can be observed to "feel" EC law to be foreign, but 
in applying its rules they matter-of-factly regard it as domestic law. 
It is practicable to eliminate this duality between EC law-related "feelings" and 
actual legal practice. It would be important to ensure that once Hungary has become a 
full-fledged member of the Community there will be no mental and emotive effects of 
bias against Community law. 
A fundamental change in respect to the legal profession and legal culture in Hungary 
will result from the fact that from 1994 the, development trend of hungarian law is 
clearly determined by the law of the European community and our adhesion to its law 
harmonization program. Higher education in law in Hungary and Hungarian 
jurisprudence will also have to adapt themselves to the altered circumstances. It is a 
welcome phenomenon that the law of the European Community is already taught in one 
form or another at all law schools of Hungary. Instruction in this subject should be 
gradually extended and made more intensive, whereas the most urgent task of Hungarian 
jurisprudence concerning EC law appears to be one for our writers on legal theory to 
reach consensus about the Hungarian legal terminology to be used for naturalising , the 
basic concepts of Community law. Efforts at solving this problem are handicapped by 
the fact that the documents of EC law have been translated into Hungarian at a rather 
low professional standard. 
VII. 
Government Decision No. 2004/1995. (I. 20.) devised an administrative mechanism 
working under the direction of the Minister of Justice to see to compliance. with 
Hungary's law harmonization obligations. In it, after having discussed the submission on 
the "plan of action for law harmonization preparatory to Hungary's accession to the 
European Union", the Government invited the ministers to observe, in drawing up their 
respective half-year plans for legislation, the time-limits set by the plan of action for law 
harmonization covering the first quinquennium as from the entry into force of the 
Association Agreement. Also, it invited the ministers to prepare, subject to the content 
of the detailed plan of action for law harmonization annexed to the Government 
Decision, their respective submissions for the first part of 1995. It invited the ministers 
to inform, before 30 April 1995, the Minister of Justice and the Permanent Secretary of 
State of the Prime Minister's Office about the law harmonization aspects of their 
respective legislative programs. It invited the Minister of Justice to submit, before 31 
October each year during the first quinquennium, a detailed plan for law harmonization 
for the next year. If invited the Minister of Industry and Commerce to submit, in 
concurrence with the ministers concerned before 31 March 1995, a program and a 
comprehensive plan of action for the adoption of Community laws and regulations that 
are in force from 1 January 1993 and govern a single internal market; taking into 
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account the situation and development possibilities of the Hungarian economy as well as 
Hungary's intention to have the negotiations on its accession to the European Union 
commence in 1997. It is obviously with attention to and by reliance on this submission 
that the Minister of Justice must fulfil his obligation, also determined by the above-
mentioned Government Decision, to present to the Government, before 5 May .1995, the 
comprehensive plan of action for law harmonization covering the first quinquennium as 
specified by the Association Agreement. Finally, the Government invited the Minister of 
justice to submit to the Government, before 31 December 1998, the comprehensive plan 
of action for law harmonization covering the second quinquennium as envisaged in the 
Association Agreement. Responsibility for coordination of compliance with these 
paragraphs of the Decision lies with the Minister of justice, who is under obligation to 
inform the government, before 30 June each year, about the status of implementation of 
the plan for law harmonization according to the time-table. 
The significance of this Government Decision, which I have amply described, lies in 
having linked Hungary's future legislative programs with the law harmonization program 
in relation to EC. In addition, this Government Decision exhibited considerable 
flexibility in making allowance for the fact that EC's law harmonization expectations 
with regard to Hungary had changed somewhat in comparison with the negotiations of 
1990-91 concerning the Association Agreement. At the time of those negotiations the 
EC norms for a single internal market were not yet in effect, so it was not possible to 
include them in the Association Agreement. However, after the entry into force of the 
norms for a single internal market in 1993, the statements by EC leaders and officials 
have outlined a desire that the part of Community law governing a single internal market 
should, regardless, of the law harmonization priorities set forth in the Association 
Agreement, be "received" as soon as possible into the legal systems of the countries 
which have concluded an Association Agreement's 
Considering that for the time being it is only through the Association Agreement that 
Hungary is legally linked to the EC system of law, the principle of "closing effect" is 
inapplicable to the fulfilment of Hungary's law harmonization obligations. This principle 
means that once the national legislations of member states have accepted a directive of 
Community law, legal development with respect to the given subject-matter of 
regulation will become the concern of. Community legislation. It stands to reason that 
this principle will not apply to Hungarian law harmonization until we achieve the status 
of member state. It follows from the specific situation arising out of the Association 
Agreement that, for the time being, the closing effect is not connected to acts of 
Hungarian legislation involving law harmonization and adoption of Community law. 
Accordingly, within the time-limits set by the Association Agreement, any particular 
subject-matter of regulation may be repeatedly covered by Hungarian legislation. In 
view of this possibility it seems practicable to envisage two phases of compliance with 
Hungary's law harmonization obligations. Therefore, in the space of the quinquennia 
determined by the Association Agreement, our plan for law, harmonization may 
schedule a three year and a five-year time-limit. Even in the case of longer deadlines set 
by the Association Agreement it appears advisable to balance fulfilment between two 
phases on such a time-scale. By contrast, it is practicable for the subject-matter of 
regulation affected by the "asymmetry method" benifiting Hungary under the 
18 See Kecskés, L.: op. cit., pp. 313-314. 
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Association Agreement to be covered in a period close to the end of the given time-
limits. 
VIII. 
A useful purpose in codification can only be served by the, experience of law 
comparison if codification has appropriate scientific support. The measure of such 
support in Hungary varies in the different areas of legislative activity. For instance, the 
measure of scientific support is especially great for classical civil-law codification, but it 
is inadequate for economy-related legislation. 
In the course of codifying economy-related law, when we sought to amalgamate 
economic and legal ideas or to write into the law economic aspects, making them a 
"concern of law", we met at every turn with differences and contradictions between 
economic and legal thinking. These hindered and still hinder our work, mainly because 
economists have a rather undifferentiated perception of law, while lawyers are inclined 
to conceive of economics as an undifferentiated system. This approach is of 
disadvantage to the work of codification as economists keep demanding clear answers 
from lawyers and vice versa, notwithstanding the fact that in our age both the economy 
and law form much too differentiated and complicated systems to be able to impart 
reality to such clear answers. The doctrine of "one solution for one problem/matter" is 
untenable under the extremely complex sets of conditions obtaining in our age. 
Pressing and narrow time-limits and the scarcity of available financial resources have 
more than once hindered us in comparison of law when coping with tasks of legislation, 
indeed often drafting "officialsmade law" under the pressure of necessity, even though 
comparison of law must be a hand tool of the codifier. It would be good to employ as 
perfect methods as possible and to use this tool as efficiently as possible: But I will 
conclude at this point, thinking of Byron, who wrote that a good worker never argues 
with his tool. 
KECSKÉS LÁSZLÓ 
EU-MAGYARORSZÁG: PERSPEKTÍVÁK A JOGSZABÁLYOK 
KÖZELÍTÉSÉBEN 
(Összefoglalás) 
A magyar jogrendszer fejlődési iránya soha nem volt annyira egyértelmű, mint 
manapság, amikor Magyarország az Európai Közösségekkel es annak tagállamaival 
kötött — 1991. december 16-án aláírt és 1994. február 1-én hatályba lépett — Társulási 
Megállapodás értelmében mar ‚jogilag is kötelezett" arra, hogy jogszabályait közelítse 
az Európai Közösség jogához. 
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A kialakulóban lévő Európai Unióhoz való csatlakozásunknak nincs más reális 
alternatívája, hiszen hazánk földrajzilag és kulturálisan is Európa része. A kérdés inkább 
az, hogy az Európai Unió mikor és milyen feltételek alapján hajlandó befogadni minket, 
illetve hogy Magyarországnak milyen csatlakozási időpont áll érdekében, és hogy ehhez 
milyen kritériumrendszert szabad elfogadnia. 
